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Beal v. Doe, Maher v. Roe, and Non-Therapeutic
Abortions: The State Does Not Have To Pay The
Bill*
[Abortion] involves the most basic and volatile principles about
which men can differ: life, death, liberty, privacy, our traditions,
our ideals, our moral values.'

Medicaid funding of abortions has engendered disagreement
among state and federal legislatures, legal commentators, 2 and
courts.' Opponents of abortion funding contend that abortion is
murder and that, by providing federal or state subsidies for such
action, the government becomes directly involved in the taking of a
human life. Proponents of Medicaid payments maintain that the
views of those who believe that abortion is immoral should not be
thrust upon those who believe otherwise. These supporters argue
that because a woman has a constitutionally protected right to
choose whether or not to obtain an abortion, the government cannot
infringe upon an indigent woman's exercise of this privilege or her
fourteenth amendment equal protection right by withholding Medicaid payments for abortions.4
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issues of abortion, Medicaid, and equal protection in Beal v. Doe,5 Maher v. Roe,I
and Poelker v. Doe.7 In Beal, the Court stated that Title XIX of the
* See Comment, Abortion on Demand in a Post-Wade Context: Must the State Pay the
Bills?, 41 FORDAM L. REv. 921 (1973).
1. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 324, 329 N.Y.S.2d
722, 729, aft'd, 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
2. Compare, e.g., Note, Medicaid and the Abortion Right, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 404
(1976), with Comment, Abortion on Demand in a Post-Wade Context: Must the State Pay
the Bills?, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 921 (1973).
3. Compare, e.g., Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd and remanded, 97 S.Ct.
2366 (1977); Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140 (W.D.S.D. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97
S. Ct. 2962 (1977); and Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd and remanded,
522 F.2d 928 (2d. Cir, 1975), interpreting Title XIX to require funding for non-therapeutic
abortions, prior to the Supreme Court decision, with Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.
1975); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th. Cir. 1975), and Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th
Cir. 1974), interpreting Title XIX not to require funding for non-therapeutic abortions, prior
to the Supreme Court decison.
4. See generally Butler, The Right to Medicaid Paymentsfor Abortion, 28 HAST. L.J. 931
(1977); Comment, State Limitations Upon the Availability and Accessibility of Abortions
after Wade and Bolton, 25 KAN. L. REV. 87 (1976).
5. 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
6. 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
7. 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977)(per curiam).
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Social Security Act 8 does not require states that participate in the
Medicaid program to fund non-therapeutic abortions.? In Maher, a
state's refusing to provide payment for elective abortions, while
providing funds for childbirth, was found to be non-violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 0 In Poelker,
the Court also addressed the equal protection issue, stating that a
public hospital's policy of providing medical services for childbirth
but not for elective abortions was constitutional."
These decisions place the question of whether non-therapeutic
abortions will be funded with public monies into the hands of Congress and state legislatures. In theory, the legislative resolution will
represent the will of the majority. In practice, however, this decision
imposes the majority's will upon those with the least political power
and the most to lose by such Medicaid restrictions-pregnant indigents.
This article will examine the statutory and constitutional issues
presented in the Supreme Court's "abortion trilogy": whether Title
XIX of the Social Security Act or the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment" require a state that pays for the costs of
childbirth and therapeutic abortions to also pay for non-therapeutic
abortions under its Medicaid program. The article will focus on
considerations, interpretations, and consequences generated by the
Court's decisions. In addition, the discussion will include an examination of post-Beal developments.
OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LITIGATION

The Supreme Court initially addressed the abortion issue with its
landmark decision in Roe v. Wade 3 and its companion case, Doe v.
Bolton. '1 Wade and Bolton invalidated state criminal abortion statutes that prohibited abortions. In Wade, the Court declared that a
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
97 S. Ct. at 2366. Non-therapeutic abortions are also referred to as elective abortions.
A therapeutic abortion, as defined in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2372
(1961), is one "induced when pregnancy constitutes a threat to the mother's life."
10. 97 S. Ct. at 2377.
11. 97 S. Ct. at 2391.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In Bolton, certain abortion procedures which restricted the availability of abortions were declared unconstitutional. This decision established several guidelines that could be used in the future by states drafting new abortion legislation.
The only abortion case to be considered by the Court prior to this time was United States
v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971). The Court, however, did not have to reach the abortion issue
in arriving at its decision that the District of Columbia abortion statute at issue, 11 D.C. Code
Encycl. § 22-201 (West), was not unconstitutionally vague.
8.
9.
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woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is encompassed
within the constitutionally protected right to privacy." The right to
make such a decision, although not absolute, 6 is a fundamental
right, and therefore state regulation is justified only by a com~lpelling
state interest. 7 The Court declared that during the first trimester
of pregnancy a woman may exercise this right free from any state
interference. 5 However, during the second trimester the state's in15. 410 U.S. at 153. Although the word privacy appears nowhere in the Constitution, the
right to privacy has long been a topic of interest among legal commentators. See, e.g., Warren
and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 H~Av. L. REv. 193 (1890).
The right of privacy was first recognized as a constitutional right in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, a Connecticut law which prohibited the use of contraceptives was found to be an unconstitutional invasion of an individual's right of marital
privacy. There was disagreement among the seven concurring justices regarding the source
of this right. Justice Douglas believed the source to be a penumbral "zone of privacy" which
emanated from the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. 381 U.S. at 484. Justices
Goldberg, Brennan and Chief Justice Warren relied on the ninth amendment, Id. at 499,
while Justices Harlan and White cited the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 500, 502. See also
Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1965).
The decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) expanded the concept of the right
of privacy. In Eisenstadt, a Massachusetts statute which proscribed the distribution of contraceptives to single individuals was held unconstitutional. The Court stated that the right
of privacy includes "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
The First Circuit has interpreted the right of privacy to include the right to voluntary
sterilization. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973). See also Comment, Prohibition of Sterilization: Hospital Prerogative or Negative Pregnant?, 54 B.U.L.
REv. 828, 833-37 (1974).
Most recently, the right of privacy was further enhanced by the decision in Carey v.
Population Services International, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977). In Carey, a New York statute which
prohibited the sale and distribution of contraceptives to persons under sixteen years of age
was found unconstitutional. The Court stated that a minor's right to privacy is constitutionally protected from unreasonable state interference. It noted that "since the state may not
impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of parental consent, on the
choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition
of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is a fortiori foreclosed." Id. at 2021. The state's
interest in discouraging early sexual behavior was found to be insufficient to justify the
governmental intrusion. Id. Relying on Griswold and Eisenstadt, the Court declared unconstitutional that portion of the statute which made it a crime for anyone but a licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons under sixteen years of age. The Court reasoned
that the law impinged upon the fundamental right of individuals to decide whether or not to
bear or beget children and that the law was not justified by any compelling state interest.
Id. at 2019.
16. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
17. Id. at 155. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
18. "For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician." 410 U.S. at 164. The only exception acknowledged by the Court was
that the state may impose a requirement that the physician performing the abortion be one
currently licensed by the state. Id. at 165.
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terest in protecting the health of the mother becomes compelling,
and the state may implement any reasonable regulation of the abortion procedure to protect this interest.'" The state's interest in protecting the life of the fetus becomes compelling at the point of
viability of the fetus. 20 After that point the state may regulate the
abortion procedure to the degree of prohibiting all but those abor2
tions necessary to save the life of the mother. '
Unfortunately, Wade and Bolton did not resolve the controversy
surrounding the abortion issue.2 2 A wealth of litigation arose attempting to define the scope of a woman's fundamental right articulated by the Wade Court. Courts dealing with the same issue and
similar circumstances often reached opposite conclusions.2 For
years, the Supreme Court deliberately avoided reinvolvement in
this area.24 Nevertheless, during the past year, the Burger Court
heard several abortion cases prior to its consideration of Beal,
25
Maher and Poelker.
In Planned ParenthoodAssociation of Missouri v. Danforth,2 the
Supreme Court considered "a logical and anticipated corollary to
Roe v. Wade. .. and Doe v. Bolton. .... 2" The holding affirmed
and expanded a woman's right to be free from state interference
with her abortion decision. The Court found unconstitutional a Missouri statute which required as a condition for abortion the consent
of the woman's spouse2 or, in the case of an unmarried minor, the
consent of a parent or person in loco parentis. 29 The Court reasoned
19. Id. at 164.
20. Id. at 164-65. "Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may
occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id. at 160.
21. Id. at 164-65.
22. Compare Heymann and Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973); and Comment, In Defense of Liberty: A Look at the
Abortion Decisions, 61 GEo. L.J. 1559 (1973), with Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme
Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 807 (1973); and Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
23. Compare, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa.
1975), aff'd in part, mem. sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976), vacated in
part, sub nom. Beal v. Franklin, 428 U.S. 901 (1976) with Planned Parenthood of Missouri
v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975), rev'd 428 U.S. 52 (1976), reaching opposite
conclusion as to constitutionality of spousal consent requirement, prior to the Supreme Court
decision. See also note 3 supra.
24. See, e.g., Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1000 (1975); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
25. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
26. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
27. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 69-70.
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that, as a result of its holding in Wade, a state does not have the
constitutional authority to delegate to itself or to a third party, an
absolute veto over the abortion decision of the woman and her physician during the first trimester of pregnancy.30 However, two other
statutory provisions were upheld. A provision requiring the woman's
written consent before receiving an abortion was not an infringement on the woman's exercise of her abortion decision, despite the
fact that prior written consent was not required for any other surgical procedure under Missouri law. The basis for the Court's decision
was the belief that because the abortion decision is such an important one, it is imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its
nature and consequences. 3 Additionally, the Court found that a
statutory provision requiring various reports and records to be kept
by physicians and clinical facilities performing abortions created
no interference with either a woman's abortion decision or the
physician-patient relationship.32 Rather, it served the state's interest
in protecting maternal health.

In Bellotti v. Baird,3" the Court confronted the constitutionality
of a state law which regulated a minor's access to abortions. The
Court, however, refused to address this issue until the state courts
had an opportunity to interpret the statute and determine whether
the law gave the minor's parents an absolute veto over the abortion
34
decision, or merely required parental consultation.
Finally, in Singleton v. Wulff,

5

two physicians who provided

abortion services for Medicaid recipients challenged the constitutionality of a Missouri statute which prohibited the use of Medicaid
funds for elective abortions. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's finding that the physicians had standing to assert the
rights of their female patients with regard to governmental interference with the abortion decision.3 6 In so doing, the Court expanded
the concept of a physician's standing from the purely criminal context, as it was originally enunciated in Bolton, to the broad civil area
as well. The Singleton Court, nevertheless, refused to rule on the
29. Id. at 74.
30. Id. at 69.
31. Id. at 67.
32. Id. at 81. The Court thereafter took the following action on the basis of the Danforth
decision: Gerstein v. Poe, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem., 428 U.S. 901 (1976);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd in part,
mern. sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901, vacated in part, sub nom. Beal v.
Franklin, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
33. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
34. Id. at 151.
35. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
36. Id. at 118.
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constitutionality of the statute in question because of a procedural
error by the appellate court.37 Therefore, the lower court's holding
that the statute was "obviously unconstitutional" was reversed, and
38
the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
As a result of the decisions in Danforth, Bellotti, and Wulff, many
issues raised by Wade and Bolton were finally resolved. However,
an important question remained unanswered: whether or not a statute which prohibits Medicaid funding of first trimester elective
abortions unconstitutionally interferes with an indigent woman's
abortion decision, and her equal protection right. Shortly thereafter
the Court addressed both the constitutional and statutory issues
presented by a state's refusal to pay for elective abortions with
Medicaid funds. Beal v. Doe 39 settled the judicial controversy regarding the construction of Title XIXI9 and paved the way for the
resolution of the constitutional question in Maher v. Roe."
MEDICAID AND THE STATE

Title XIX of the Social Security Act12 establishes the Medical
Assistance Program (Medicaid). The purpose of the Medicaid program is to implement medical assistance programs for individuals
unable to pay for the costs of "necessary medical services.' 3 In
order to achieve this purpose, Congress authorized the appropriation of federal funds to states that elect to participate in the plan."
The program operates as a vendor payment program, i.e., providers
of health care services are reimbursed by Medicaid.15 Because Medicaid does not directly provide health care services, it cannot guarantee that providers of such services will be available or accessible in
a given area.
The Medicaid program is based on a scheme of "cooperative federalism." 6 Under this system states have generally been given wide
37. The Court decided that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in reaching the
merits of the case and should have remanded it to the district court for determination of the
statute's constitutionality. Id. at 119-21.
38. Id. at 121.
39. 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
40. See note 3 supra.
41. 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
43. Id. § 1396 (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 1396d(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
46. Under a scheme of cooperative federalism, the state and federal government work
together to attain a common objective. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970);
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
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administrative discretion,47 limited only by expressed and implied
congressional policies." On the federal level the Medicaid program
is administered by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,
and Medicaid distributions are handled by the Health Care Financing Administration. 9 On the state level, only one agency is required
to perform administrative services for the program."
State participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary. However, once a state joins, certain statutory requirements must be
met."' Although a state may determine to whom and to what extent
medical assistance will be provided, it must do so under standards
that are reasonable and consistent with the objectives of the program." These standards must provide for simplicity of administration and the best interest of the recipient53 and must prevent the
unnecessary utilization of services.54 Additionally, participating
states must provide specified minimum aid to certain groups of
people classified as "categorically needy," 5 including the blind,
aged, disabled, and families with dependent children. Assistance
must be furnished to the categorically needy in the following areas:
out-patient hospital services, in-patient hospital services (except for
those in mental or tuberculosis institutions), screening and diagnosis of minors, laboratory and X-ray services, family planning serv47. See New York Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (upholding as
consistent with the Social Security Act (SSA) one state's requirement that individuals receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) accept employment as a condition for
receipt of aid); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding as consistent with SSA
a state's policy of computing and granting different standards of need to different categorically needy groups); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding as consistent
with SSA a state's regulation of establishing a maximum amount of AFDC benefits available
to any one family).
48. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 615-16 (3d Cir. 1975). See Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S.
338 (1975) (New York lodger regulations inconsistent with the SSA); Townsend v. Swank,
404 U.S. 282 (1971) (Illinois statute which disqualified needy dependent children from AFDC
coverage if they attended college inconsistent with SSA); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
(1970) (New York law which reduced standard of need for AFDC benefits inconsistent with
SSA); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (Alabama regulation which denied AFDC benefits
to children of mothers who cohabitated out of wedlock inconsistent with SSA).
49. 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
14,755 (1977). As of March 8, 1977, the
administrative duties for the Medicaid program were transferred from the Social and Rehabilitation Services division to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). The HCFA
has assumed the duties for the Medicare program as well.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
51. Id.§ 1396a (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
52. Id.§ 1396a(a)(17) (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
53. Id.§ 1396a(a)(19) (1970).
54. Id. §1396a(a)(30) (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
55. Id.§ 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974). The term "categorically
needy" is derived from the fact that these individuals receive assistance under other categories of the Social Security Act.
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ices and supplies, and physicians' services. 5
In addition to the categorically needy, the "medically needy" may
also receive services under the Medicaid program. 7 Generally, the
medically needy are those individuals whose incomes preclude them
from being considered categorically needy, but who are still unable
to pay their own medical expenses." A state has the discretion to
determine what type of assistance it can afford to supply to the
medically needy." However, once a state decides to provide a particular service to both the categorically and the medically needy, the
services provided to all recipients must be equal.60
THE CASES

Beal v. Doe: FactualBackground
Participating in the aforementioned Medicaid program, the state
of Pennsylvania elected to provide medically needy persons with the
same benefits that were provided for the categorically needy, with
the exception of screening and diagnosis of children. One of the
state's Medicaid regulations limited assistance to cover only certifiable medically necessary abortions."'
Respondents qualified for Pennsylvania medical assistance, but
were denied Medicaid funding for their abortions because they
failed to obtain a physician's certificate stating that the abortions
were medically necessary. Thereafter, respondents filed suit against
the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.2 They alleged the state Medicaid regula42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
58. 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 14,211 (1976).
59. For the medically needy, the state may provide any one or all of the services required
to be provided for the categorically needy, as well as other optional services. 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(13)(C)(1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
60. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(B), (C) (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974). This provision is
commonly referred to as the "comparability standard."
61. Under the Pennsylvania Medicaid program, an abortion is considered to be medically
necessary if:
(1) There is documented medical evidence that continuance of the pregnancy may
threaten the health of the mother; (2) There is documented medical evidence that
an infant may be born with incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency;
or (3) There is documented medical evidence that a continuance of a pregnancy
resulting from legally established statutory or forcible rape or incest, may constitute
a threat to the mental or physical health of a patient; and (4) Two other physicians
chosen because of their recognized professional competency have examined the
patient and have concurred in writing; and (5) The procedure is performed in a
hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
97 S. Ct. at 2369 n.3, citing Brief for Petitioners, at 4, citing 3 PENNsYLvANIA BULLrTIN 2207,
2209 (Sept. 29, 1973).
62. Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
56.
57.
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tion was inconsistent with Title XIX because it permitted the state
to circumvent the funding of a necessary medical service and unreasonably interfered with the professional judgment of the attending
physician regarding the appropriate method of treatment for his/her
patient. 3 Furthermore, the respondents claimed that the regulation
was violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the woman's right to privacy articulated in Wade."4
A three-judge district court decided that the Pennsylvania regulation limiting Medicaid funding to medically necessary abortions
was consistent with Title XIX15 This decision was predicated upon
congressional silence concerning specific authorization of medical
assistance for abortions"6 and the pervasive scheme of cooperative
federalism. 7 The court, however, agreed with the respondents' constitutional argument and declared the regulation unconstitutional
as applied during the first trimester of pregnancy, 8 because it created "an unlawful distinction between indigent women who choose
to carry their pregnancies to birth, and indigent women who choose
to terminate their pregnancies by abortion."69
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the lower court decision on
the statutory issue and did not, therefore, reach the constitutional
claim. 0 The appellate court held the regulation to be inconsistent
with Title XIX because it accorded unequal treatment to pregnant
women by prohibiting funding of non-therapeutic abortions while
allowing payment for therapeutic abortions.7 ' Additionally, the regulation imposed upon pregnant women seeking abortions the "least
voluntary method of treatment,"" while failing to impose any similar limitation upon other Medicaid recipients. The court also noted
63. Brief for Respondent, at 2.
64. 97 S. Ct. at 2370.
65. 376 F. Supp. at 182-86.
66. The WohIgemuth court reasoned that "while nowhere in the Act is there a specific
provision authorizing medical assistance payments for abortions, there are a number of sections that, when considered together with corollary regulations, must be interpreted to permit
reimbursement for the costs of abortions performed." 376 F. Supp. at 184. Among the sections
listed by the court are 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1), pertaining to in-patient hospital services, 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(5), pertaining to physician's services, 42 U.S.C. §1396d(a)(6), pertaining
to medical care or other remedial care recognized by state law and furnished by a licensed
practitoner within the scope of his practice as defined by state law, and 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(a)(4), pertaining to family planning services.
67. 376 F. Supp. at 184.
68. Id. at 186-92.
69. Id. at 191.
70. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975). The case caption was changed pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1), after the appeal had been docketed in the court of appeals.
71. 523 F.2d at 619.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 621-23.
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that the Pennsylvania regulation unreasonably interfered with the
professional judgment of the attending physician."
In reaching this decision, the court was of the view that under the
Medicaid program a state has the discretion to select the necessary
medical conditions to be covered. However, in order to be consistent
with congressional intent, the specific treatment of those conditions
must be left to the judgment of the attending physician." Furthermore, reasonable regulations of the methods of treatment are allowed if they are consistent with Title XIX.7 e
When the Pennsylvania regulation was compared to these standards, the appellate court found that the state, by electing to pay
for childbirth and therapeutic abortions, had determined that pregnancy was a necessary medical condition covered by the Medicaid
program. Once this determination had been made, Pennsylvania
could not, consistent with Title XIX, limit the methods available
to an attending physician for the treatment of this condition."
Supreme Court Opinion
In deciding whether Title XIX requires states to subsidize the
costs of non-therapeutic abortions, the United States Supreme
Court considered the language of the statute, the state interests
involved, congressional intent, and existing HEW interpretations.
The Court's examination revealed two key factors: (1) the absence
of any mention of abortion, or other medical procedure, in the language of Title XIX; and (2) a state's wide discretion under the
Medicaid program to select the type of medical assistance available.78 The Court declared that "nothing in the statute suggests that
participating States are required to fund every medical procedure
that falls within the delineated categories of medical care."' , It acknowledged that "serious statutory questions" would be raised if a
state refused to provide necessary medical services, as opposed to
"unnecessary-though perhaps desirable- medical services."
74. Id. at 621-22.
75. Id. at 620. In support of its determination that it was the intent of Congress to confer
upon the attending physician the primary authority for determining the proper treatment for
an individual, the court referred to the report by the Senate Committee on Finance concerning the role of the physician in the Medicaid and Medicare program: "The committee's bill
provides that the physician is to be the key figure in determining utilization of health services-and provides that it is a physician who is to decide upon admission to a hospital, order
tests, drugs, and treatments, and determine the length of stay." S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in [19651 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 1943, 1986; 523 F.2d at 618.
76. 523 F.2d at 621.
77. Id. at 621-22.
78. 97 S. Ct. at 2371. See notes 43, 49-58 supra, and accompanying text.
79. 97 S. Ct. at 2371.
80. Id.
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However, after examining the state regulation, the Court found that
Pennsylvania's rule did provide for medically necessary services
and, thus, was consistent with Title XIX.5 '
The Court's decision was made without benefit of a clear-cut
definition, since Congress has never stated what constitutes a medically necessary service within the meaning of Title XIX. One federal
district court rejected the contention that the term defines the type
of assistance to be provided under the Medicaid program, and suggested that the term modifies a person's eligibility for Medicaid
assistance."2 Apparently, the Supreme Court placed some reliance
on the fact that Pennsylvania's definition of a medically necessary
abortion included the standards set forth in Doe v. Bolton;3 Bolton
enumerated the factors that a physician should take into considera84
tion in determining whether an abortion is medically necessary.
The Court also found the statute reasonable because it promoted
a valid state interest in fostering childbirth.15 This interest was sufficient to overcome the argument that the regulation was inconsistent
with the standards of Title XIX because it could not be justified on
a health 8 or economic87 basis.
The contention that the regulation interfered with the professional judgment of the physician was relegated to footnote discussion. 8 This regulation did not interfere with the physician's determination of the necessary treatment. The attending physician was
still free to determine the best treatment for the patient. The regulation merely precluded state financial coverage for those abortions
that did not meet the medical necessity requirements.
81.
82.

Id. at 2371-72.
Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726, 728 (D.Conn. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.

1975).

83.
84.

97 S. Ct. at 2369 n.3. See also note 84 infra.
Whether "an abortion is necessary" is a professional judgment that . . . may
be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial,
and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors
may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the room he needs to
make his best medical judgment.
410 U.S. at 192.
85. Id. at 2372.
86. An abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy poses less of a threat to the
woman's health than childbirth. See note 156 infra.
87. Under Medicaid, the average cost of an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy is $150.00 and during the second trimester, $350.00. See generally HEW Memorandum,
120 CONG. REc. 19678 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974). On the other hand, the average costs of
childbirth and care for the child's first year is $2200.00. See generally Senate Debate on §
209 of Department of Labor, Health, Education and Welfare Appropriations Act, 122 CONG.
REC. 10795 (daily ed. June 28, 1976).
88. 97 S. Ct. at 2371 n.9.
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Furthermore, the Court found no congressional intent to mandate
the funding of elective abortions through Title XIX. This position
is correct. At the time Title XIX was passed, elective abortions were
illegal in most states; thus, it is improbable that Congress proposed
mandatory, rather than optional funding of elective abortions under
their Medicaid programs. 0 Moreover, it is consistent with the wide
administrative discretion afforded the states under the Medicaid
program to infer that when Congress amended Title XIX by adding
family planning services 9' to the categories of required minimum
coverage for the categorically needy," the intent was to permit, but
not require, coverage of elective abortions. If Congress had wanted
to require the funding of non-therapeutic abortions under this or
any other section of Title XIX, it could have either specifically
included abortion as a method of family planning or explicitly mentioned that elective abortions would be covered under one or more
of the categories of services offered. However, Congress did not do
so, despite the fact that on other occasions it expressly declared that
elective abortions were excluded from federal funding. 3
Finally, the Court relied on the statutory interpretations adopted
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare that abortion
subsidies may be allowed, but are not required by Title XIX:
The position taken

. . .

on abortion is that the Social Security Act

and the HEW regulations provide for federal matching of state
89. One section of the Pennsylvania regulation, which requires the concurring opinions
of two physicians besides the woman's attending physician before the funding of a therapeutic
abortion would be approved, was considered as possibly violative of Title XIX. Therefore,
the Court, after vacating the appellate court decision, remanded the case for further consider-

ation of this requirement. 97 S. Ct. at 2373.
90. 97 S. Ct. at 2372.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (Supp.IV 1974).
92. Id. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1970), as amended, (Supp.IV 1974).
93. See, e.g., Family Planning Services Research Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-b (1970), as
amended, (Supp.IV 1974) (abortion as a method of family planning specifically excluded);
Legal Services Corporation, 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8) (Supp.IV 1974) (prohibited legal services
attorneys from assisting clients in obtaining abortions). For fiscal 1977, Congress has expressly prohibited the use of federal Medicaid funds for all abortions except those "where the
life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term." Act of Sept. 30,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976).
The constitutionality of § 209, commonly known as the Hyde Amendment, was challenged
in McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Doe v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 865
(D.N.J. 1976); Doe v. Mathews, Civil No. 76-1835 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1976). In McRae, § 209
was declared unconstitutional and an injunction, effective nation-wide, was issued prohibiting the enforcement of § 209. The court was of the view that the section infringed upon the
exercise of a woman's fundamental right to decide whether or not to obtain an abortion.
However, as a result of the holdings in Beal and Maher, the decision in McRae was vacated
and the case remanded to the district court for further consideration. Califano v. McRae, 97

S.Ct. 2993 (1977).
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expenditures for all kinds of medical care and services, including
inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital services, physician
services, drugs, etc. If the state Medicaid program pays for these
services whether for abortion, or any other medical procedure, the
federal Government shares the cost with the state. 4
Unable to uncover any errors that would render the agency's interpretation invalid, the Court adhered to case precedent" and affirmed this administrative interpretation. Thus, the Beal decision
does not prohibit a state from electing to provide Medicaid coverage
for non-therapeutic abortions; it merely holds that a state is not
required to afford such coverage."
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, believed that an elective abortion constitutes
a medically necessary treatment for the condition of pregnancy."
The dissenters reasoned that abortion and childbirth are two alternate methods for treating pregnancy." Title XIX," congressional
intent,' and judicial precedent' 01 leave the abortion decision up to
the woman and her doctor, free from state interference, at least
during the first trimester of pregnancy. Consequently, if a state
should elect to fund childbirth and therapeutic abortions as necessary medical services under its Medicaid program, logically it
should be required to fund elective abortions as well. 02
The minority also was of the view that Congress, by enacting the
1972 amendment to Title XIX, had evidenced an intent to require
the funding of abortions by Medicaid." 3 As a result of this interpretation of Title XIX, the dissenters considered HEW's construction
of the Act to be "patently inconsistent with the controlling statute."'0 4 Finally, the justices feared the practical effect of the majority's construction of Title XIX would be disastrous. Pregnant indigents, faced with the option of either carrying their pregnancies full
term and having Medicaid pay the bill, or having an elective abor14,511 (1977), quoting letter from Chief,
94. 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
Public Inquiry Office of Medical Services Administration, Aug. 12, 1970.
95. See, e.g., New York Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
96. 97 S. Ct. at 2372.
97. Id. at 2373.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2373-74.
100. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192,
197 (1973).
102. 97 S. Ct. at 2375.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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tion paid out of their personal resources, would invariably choose
the former. As a consequence, these indigents would be forced to
bear children that they otherwise would not have borne." 5
In Beal, the Court narrowly construed the Medicaid regulation.
It was reluctant to find a congressional mandate in the absence of
any express or implied indication that Congress intended that elective abortions be included in Medicaid services. The Beal decision
strengthened the policy of cooperative federalism and was consistent with prior judicial decisions that upheld a wide grant of discretion to the states in administering joint federal-state programs.'
The ultimate decision whether elective abortions should be funded
with public monies was left to publicly-elected legislatures which,
in the Court's view, are the best judges of controversial socioeconomic policy questions. 07 With the resolution of the statutory
issue in Beal, the way was cleared for determination of the constitutional question presented by Connecticut's refusal to fund elective
abortions under its Medicaid program in Maher v. Roe. 08
Maher v. Roe: FactualBackground
In Maher, appellees challenged a Connecticut welfare regulation,
similar to the Pennsylvania regulation in Beal, which limited Medicaid funding of first trimester abortions to those that were medically
necessary.' Appellees were denied abortion funding because they
were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of medical necessity.
The appellees argued that the regulation was inconsistent with Title
XIX and violative of their fourteenth amendment due process and
equal protection rights. They contended that childbirth and abortion should be treated equally under the Medicaid program. Thus,
the state provision represented an unconstitutional policy prefer105. Id. at 2376.
106. See note 47 supra.
107. 97 S. Ct. at 2372-73 n.15, 2385-86, 2392.
108. 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
109. The Department makes payment for abortion services under the Medical
Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions are met: 1. In the
opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medically necessary. The term
"Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric necessity. 2. The abortion is to be
performed in an accredited hospital or licensed clinic when the patient is in the first
trimester of pregnancy . . . . 3. The written request for the abortion is submitted
by the patient, and in the case of a minor, from [sic] the parent or guardian. 4.
Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of Medical Services,
Division of Health Services, Department of Social Services.
97 S. Ct. at 2378 n.2, quoting Connecticut Welfare Department, Public Assistance Program
Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275.
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ence in that it funded the costs of childbirth, but excluded the costs
of abortion." 0
The trial court found the regulation to be inconsistent with the
requirements of Title XIX,' but that judgment was reversed on
appeal." 2 On remand for consideration of the constitutional issue,
the district court was unable to find an independent constitutional
right to a state-subsidized abortion. Nonetheless, the court declared
the Connecticut regulation violative of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.' The court premised its finding
upon its interpretation of Wade and Bolton that "abortion and
childbirth. . are simply two alternate medical methods of dealing
with pregnancy."" 4 Thus, if the state chose to pay for childbirth
expenses under Medicaid, it could not, consistent with Wade,
Bolton, and the fourteenth amendment, refuse to fund abortions.
Moreover, relying on the penalty analysis promulgated in Shapiro
v. Thompson"5 and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,"' the
lower court concluded that the Connecticut regulation penalized the
exercise of the indigent woman's right to decide to terminate her
pregnancy in that it "weights the choice of the pregnant mother
against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right to
an elective abortion . . .[and] thus infringes upon a fundamental

interest.""'
Supreme Court Opinion
In considering the constitutionality of the Connecticut regulation,
the Supreme Court first had to decide which equal protection standard would be applied. The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause forbids a state from invidiously discriminating between
two similarly situated groups of individuals. Under the traditional
two-tiered equal protection analysis,"18 if a classification infringes
110. Id. at 2380.
111. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974).
112. Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975).
113. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975).
114. Id. at 663 n.3. See also note 98 supra and accompanying text.
115. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See notes 128-33 infra and accompanying text.
116. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). See notes 128-33 infra and accompanying text.
117. 408 F. Supp. at 663-64.
118. See generally San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976). For a more extensive
discussion of the different equal protection theories see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HsAiv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
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upon a "fundamental right""' 9 or involves a "suspect classification," ' 2 ° the classification will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Unless a compelling state interest justifies the disparate treatment,
the classification will be constitutionally impermissible. Alternatively, where no fundamental right or subject classification is involved, the classification will be upheld, despite its discriminatory
effect, provided it is rationally related to a legitimate state pur2
pose. 1 1
Applying the two-tiered analysis, the Court determined that the
Connecticut regulation did not discriminate against a suspect
class.'21 2 This determination accords with the Court's consistent refusal to formally declare suspect any classification based solely on
wealth.' 2 3 However, there are cases where a state has been forced to
remove financial obstacles in order to make a fundamental right
more accessible for indigents. In the criminal context, Griffin v.
Illinois124 held that a state could not impose court and transcript fees
which would effectively bar an indigent's access to his/her fundamental right to a criminal appeal.' 25 In the civil area, however, the
Court is reluctant to abolish economic barriers for indigents. An
exception is Boddie v. Connecticut,'2 where the Court found that
indigents cannot be precluded from divorce by inability to pay filing
fees. Subsequent decisions narrowly construed the Boddie rationale. 2 7 Thus, the Court will only eliminate financial obstacles where
the government monopolizes the services involved and creates the
financial barriers sought to be abolished. In Maher, the abortion
services and the obstacles in question were neither monopolized nor
119. Fundamental rights include the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965); the right to travel
interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); the right to avoid involuntary
sterilization, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); the right of parents to raise
and educate their children, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
120. Suspect classifications include those based on race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
121. See authorities cited in note 118 supra.
122. 97 S. Ct. at 2381.
123. See, e.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
124. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
125. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel on appeal); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (transcripts);
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (court filing fees).
126. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (bankruptcy fees held not
waivable for indigency); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (court costs for civil appeals
held not waivable for indigency).
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created by the state. The financial barrier is created by the physician demanding payment for his/her services. Therefore, Maher is
distinguishable from prior cases where financial barriers have been
removed so that indigents could more easily exercise a fundamental
right.
The Maher Court also rejected the appellees' contention that the
Connecticut regulation penalized the exercise of a woman's right to
decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 12 8 The penalty
analysis was first applied in Shapiro v. Thompson,'1 and later in
0
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 13
to invalidate state statutes which established durational residency requirements as a prerequisite for the receipt of welfare benefits. 131 In both cases, the
Court held that the statutes in question penalized the exercise of an
individual's fundamental right to travel interstate by denying them
the "basic necessities of life."' 32 Shapiro and Maricopaare, however,
distinguishable from and inapplicable to the facts in Maher. First,
unlike the statutes in Shapiro and Maricopa, the Connecticut regulation does not deny any basic necessity of life to indigent women
who obtain an elective abortion. Furthermore, as noted by the
Maher Court, "Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to
pay the bus fares of the indigent travelers."' 33 Likewise, Connecticut
does not penalize the right of a woman to decide whether or not to
obtain an abortion by refusing to pay for an elective abortion.
The Court next determined that the regulation did not impinge
upon a fundamental right. 134 In order to justify this decision, the
Court clarified the scope of the woman's right involved and the
regulation's effect upon it. The Court noted that a woman's freedom
to decide to obtain an abortion is protected from "unduly burdensome" state interference.'315 Examples of such interference are the
criminal abortion statute in Roe v. Wade,' 31 and the spousal consent
requirement in Planned ParenthoodAssociation of Missouri v.
Danforth,137 which created absolute obstacles to a woman's abortion
128. 97 S. Ct. at 2383 n.8.
129. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
130. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
131. In Shapiro, the benefits in question were basic welfare benefits, whereas in Maricopa
County, the benefits involved non-emergency medical care.
132. 394 U.S. at 627; 415 U.S. at 269.
133. 97 S. Ct. at 2383 n.8.

134.

Id.

135. Id. at 2382.
136. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also notes 13-21 supra and accompanying text.
137. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text. In his dissent
in Maher, Justice Brennan contended that in Danforth, the spousal consent requirement that
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decision, and the state prohibitions on the sale and distribution of
contraceptives in Carey v. Population Services International,3 '
which, though not an absolute interference, was nonetheless found
to be constitutionally impermissible.
Distinguishing the effect of the Connecticut regulation upon the
woman's right to decide whether or not to obtain an abortion, the
Court stated that the right "implies no limitation on the authority
of a state to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds."' 39 Thus, a state regulation may encourage a woman to carry
her pregnancy to term, and still not create an unduly burdensome
interference with her abortion decision. "' Any obstacles a poor
woman may have in obtaining an abortion are pre-existent and not
the result of the state's action. The woman is still free to use private
means, if available, to procure an abortion.''
In this respect, the Maher decision is consistent with prior decisions inferring that there is a distinction "between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an
alternative activity consonant with legislative policy."'4 For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska' and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' state
laws which prohibited, respectively, the teaching of a foreign language in public schools and the sending of children to private
schools were found to be impermissible restrictions on fundamental
interests protected by the fourteenth amendment.'45 However, neither case held that a state was prohibited from making a policy
choice which encouraged a preferred course of action. Consequently,
it is constitutionally permissible for a state to create school curricula
which provide for the instruction of one language and not another,
for a state to fund public and not private education, or, as the
the majority referred to as an absolute obstacle to a woman's abortion decision "was
Iabsolute' only in the limited sense that a woman who was unable to persuade her spouse to
agree to an elective abortion was prevented from obtaining one." 97 S. Ct. at 2389. Accordingly, any woman whose spouse did agree to the procedure was free to procure an abortion
"and the State never imposed directly any prohibition of its own." Id.
138. 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977). See also note 15 supra and accompanying text.
139. 97 S. Ct. at 2382.
140. Id. at 2382-83.
141. Id. Mr. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Beal, found the Court's belief that a
penniless pregnant woman may go elsewhere to procure an abortion reminiscent of "Let them
eat cake." Id. at 2399.
142. Id. at 2383.
143. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
144. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
145. The fundamental right involved in Meyer and Piercewas the right of a parent to raise
and educate his/her child as he/she sees fit.
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Maher Court reasoned, for a state to pay the costs of childbirth but
not the costs of abortions.
As a result of the Court's determination that the Connecticut
regulation did not discriminate against a suspect class or infringe
upon a fundamental right, strict scrutiny was not required and no
compelling state interest was necessary to justify the classification.
Instead, the mere "rational basis" standard was applicable and the
regulation would be constitutional if it promoted a legitimate state
interest. This less rigorous standard was easily met, since the Court
found the regulation furthered the state's "strong and legitimate
interest in encouraging normal childbirth."'' 6 Thus, the Connecticut
regulation withstood the equal protection challenge.'4 7
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and Marshall, viewed the majority's decision as an erosion of Wade and
Bolton. The dissenters believed that the practical effect of the financial pressure created by the state regulation would coerce pregnant
indigent women into bearing unwanted children, thereby inhibiting
their exercise of the abortion decision. 8
The traditional bifurcated equal protection analysis was rejected
by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Beal v. Doe. " ' The alternate
test recommended by Marshall involves balancing three factors:
"the importance of the governmental benefits denied, the character
of the class, and the asserted state interests."'510 In Justice Marshall's opinion, the application of this standard to the state welfare
regulations in Beal and Maher, and the public hospital policy in
146. 97 S. Ct. at 2385. In a footnote reference, the Court indicated that "[in addition
to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may have legitimate demographic
concerns about its rate of population growth . .
[which] in some circumstances could
constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position of neutrality between abortion
and childbirth." Id. at 2385 n.ll.
147. The Court also upheld Connecticut's requirements of prior written request by the
pregnant woman and prior authorization for the abortion by the Department of Social Services. It cited Danforth in support of its decision on the former requirement and justified its
determination concerning the latter requirement on the grounds that it is reasonable for a
state to require a showing of medical necessity for an abortion and not for other medical
procedures because only an abortion involves the termination of a potential human life. 97
S. Ct. at 2386.
148. Id. at 2387.
149. Id. at 2396.
150. Id. citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 322 (1976). In
addition to the strict scrutiny/mere rationality test applied by the Court in Maher, and the
tri-factor analysis recommended by Justice Marshall, an intermediate standard has been
suggested by Gunther. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine On A Changing Court: A Model ForA Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 20 (1972). Under his invigorated rational basis test, "legislative means must
substantially further legislative ends." Id. at 20-21.
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Poelker, would lead to their invalidation 5 ' for three reasons: (1) the
Medicaid benefits denied are of the utmost importance and have
far-reaching effects upon the lives of the recipients; (2) the regulation disparately affects the poor and the non-white; and (3) there is
no state interest sufficient to overcome the combined effects of the
first two factors upon the constitutional rights involved.'
In contrast to the Supreme Court, every other federal court which
has considered the constitutionality of a classification that prohibited Medicaid funding for elective abortions while paying for childbirth expenses, found such a classification violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5 3 Furthermore,
almost every court reaching this conclusion applied a strict scrutiny
/compelling state interest analysis to arrive at its decision. 54
Clearly, if the Maher Court had found that strict scrutiny analysis
was appropriate, there could be no compelling state interest during
the first or second trimester of pregnancy which would justify the
disparate effect of this funding regulation upon the rights of pregnant indigents. Wade emphatically declared that during the first
trimester of pregnancy there exists no compelling state interest
which justifies a state's interference with a woman's abortion decision. ' During the second trimester, when a state may regulate the
abortion decision to protect the maternal health, no compelling
state interest could be sustained because during this period an elective abortion is safer to maternal health than childbirth. 6 Further151. 97 S. Ct. at 2398.
152. Id. at 2396-98.
153. See, e.g., Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663-64 (D. Conn. 1975), rev'd and remanded sub noma. Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977); Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211,
1215-16 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d
1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143, 1147 (D.S.D. 1974), vacated
and remanded in light of Hagans v. Lavine, 420 U.S. 968, on remand, 402 F. Supp. 140, 144
(D.S.D. 1975), vacated and remanded in light of Beal v. Doe and Maher v. Roe, mem., 97 S.
Ct. 2962 (1977); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 186-92 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified and
remanded sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd and remanded, 97 S. Ct.
2366 (1977); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 193 (D. Utah), vacated and remanded in light
of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Klein v. Nassau County Medical
Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)(per curiam), vacated and remanded in light
of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, 412 U.S. 925 (1973), on remand, 409 F. Supp. 731
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (per curiam), vacated and remanded in light of Beal v. Doe and Maher v.
Roe, mem. sub nom. Toia v. Klein, 97 S. Ct. 2962 (1977). (In Klein an administrative letter
of the New York State Commissioner of Social Services, rather than a state welfare regulation, prohibited the funding of elective abortions under Medicaid.)
154. See, e.g., Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1115-17 (10th Cir. 1974); Roe v. Norton, 408 F.
Supp. 660, 663-64 (D. Conn. 1975); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 189-90, 191-92
(WD. Pa. 1974), modified and remanded sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975),
rev'd and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
155. 410 U.S. at 163.
156. During the 13th through 15th week of pregnancy, the mortality rate for abortions was
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more, during the second trimester of pregnancy there is no economic
justification for the regulation because the costs of an elective abortion at this time are much less than the costs of childbirth.'5 7 Therefore, only during the third trimester would the state's interest in the
life of the fetus become sufficiently compelling to overcome the
impact of the restrictive regulation upon the woman's fundamental
right."'
Poelker v. Doe
In Poelker v. Doe, 59 the Supreme Court considered St. Louis'
policy of prohibiting publicly financed hospitals from providing
services for elective abortions while furnishing hospital services for
childbirth. The city policy was derived from the combination of a
policy directive issued by the mayor of St. Louis forbidding the
performance of elective abortions, and a staffing practice at the
public hospital whereby the physicians and medical students in the
obstetrics-gynecology department were recruited from a Jesuit-run
medical school opposed to abortion.6 0 Because the issue in Poelker
was constitutionality identical to that in Maher v. Roe,'" the Court
relied on the reasons announced in Maher to support its finding that
the St. Louis scheme was constitutionally permissible as a justifia2
ble expression of a policy preference for childbirth.
Predictably, Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun found
the city's policy to be an unconstitutional interference with a
4.5 per 100,000; during the 16th through 20th week of pregnancy, the mortality rate for
abortions was 14.5 per 100,000; and during the 21st or greater weeks of pregnancy, the mortality rate for abortions was 9.7 per 100,000. By contrast, the mortality rate for full-term pregnancies in 1972 was 16.6 per 100,000 live births. Center for Disease Control, Dep't of Health,
Education and Welfare, 24 MoRawrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT No. 3, at 27-28 (Jan. 18,
1975).
157. See note 87 supra.
158. As a result of the decisions in Beal and Maher, the Court took the following action:
Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974), vacated and remanded in light of Hagans
v. Lavine, 420 U.S. 968, on remand, 402 F. Supp. 140 (D.S.D. 1975), vacated and remanded
in light of Beal v. Doe and Maher v. Roe, mem., 97 S. Ct. 2962 (1977); Klein v. Nassau County
Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (per curiam), vacated and remanded in
light of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, 412 U.S. 925 (1973), on remand, 409 F. Supp. 731
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (per curiam), vacated and remanded in light of Beal v. Doe and Maher v.
Roe, mem. sub noam., Toia v. Klein, 97 S. Ct. 2962 (1977); Doe v. Stewart, Civil No. 74-3197
(E.D. La. Jan. 26, 1976), aff'd mem., 97 S. Ct. 2963 (1977); McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp.
533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated and remanded mem. sub nom., Califano v. McRae, 97 S. Ct.
2993 (1977); Buckley v. McRae, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), appeal dismissed mem.,
97 S. Ct. 2993 (1977).
159. 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977) (per curiam).
160. Id. at 2392.
161. 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
162. 97 S. Ct. at 2392-93.
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woman's abortion decision." 3 The policy was thought to create a
substantial and insurmountable barrier, which coerces an indigent
woman into having children she might not otherwise bear.16
The Poelker decision may have a far-reaching impact upon the
availability and accessibility of elective abortions throughout the
United States. As noted by the dissenters, "during 1975 and the first
quarter of 1976 only about 18% of all public hospitals in the country
provided abortion services, and in 10 States there were no public
hospitals providing such services."' 6 5 In light of these statistics, if
more public hospitals that presently provide elective abortion services adopt restrictive policies similar to the one in Poelker, the result
could be especially devastating to the pregnant indigent seeking an
abortion. The non-indigent woman seeking an elective abortion
may be inconvenienced by the costs of traveling to another area or
going to a private hospital to obtain her abortion; for an indigent
woman these costs may be prohibitive.
Furthermore, if an abortion-restrictive policy is adopted in public
hospitals which have physicians on their staffs willing to perform
elective abortions, unless these physicians are also associated with
private facilities that provide abortion services, this action will reduce the number of physicians available to perform abortions. The
availability and accessibility of more free private clinics which provide abortion services will help to offset Poelker's adverse impact
upon the pregnant indigent seeking an elective abortion. However,
in areas where no such clinics exist, or in cases where an abortion
performed in a non-hospital setting will create risks to the woman's
health, the prohibitive abortion policy of the local hospital may
make it impossible for the pregnant indigent to obtain the
medically safe abortion she desires.
PoST-Beal DEVELOPMENTS

The decisions in Beal, Maher, and Poelker reflect the Burger
Court's policy of deferring to the legislature for the resolution of
controversial socio-economic issues. Although the abortion trilogy is
harsh and unsympathetic toward the plight of pregnant indigents,
the holdings are legally justifiable. The Court simply delegated to
the legislature the final task of determining whether public funds
should subsidize elective abortions for the poor. The legislative re163.
164.
165.

Id. at 2393.
Id. at 2394.
Sullivan, Tietze, & Dryfoos, LegalAbortion in the United States, 1975-1976, 9 FAMILY
PLANNING PEaRSPEC
Es 116, 121, 128 (1977); 97 S. Ct. at 2393 n.1. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sponse to Beal and Maher indicates that the federal and state legislatures favor reducing, rather than increasing, the allocation of public monies for non-therapeutic abortions.
After Wade and Bolton, strong political pressure was applied to
legislators to vote for more restrictive abortion funding legislation. 6'
Thus, the legislative response to Beal and Maher was immediate
and extensive. Shortly after the decisions were announced, the
United States Senate voted to prohibit the use of fiscal 1978 funds
for all abortions except those where the life of the mother is endangered, and in the cases of rape, incest or medical necessity.6 7 Similarly, the Illinois legislature passed a bill that would amend the
Illinois Public Aid Code to exclude abortions from authorized medical assistance unless a physician determined that an abortion was
necessary to preserve the life of the mother.6 8 To date, more than
twenty state legislatures have voted to eliminate public funding of
non-therapeutic abortions.'
If the Senate's resolution is adopted, there will be no federal funds
for elective abortions in fiscal 1978. States, however, may still opt
to pay for elective abortions under their Medicaid programs. The
major difference will be that the entire cost of the elective abortion
will be borne by the state itself. Unfortunately, as previously noted,
many of the states which originally provided Medicaid funding for
elective abortions have, since the decisions in Beal and Maher,
voted to cut off further funding for such procedures. Nevertheless,
there may be a procedure which pro-abortion forces can use to assure partial funding. The exception depends upon the definition of
the term "medical necessity" used in the various federal and state
bills. If a bill does not limit medically necessary abortions to those
resulting from certain specified occurrences, but instead leaves this
decision to the total discretion of the attending physician, then more
types of abortion will come within the definition of the term. For
166. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
167. S. Res. 605, 123 CONG. REc. 11050 (daily ed. June 29, 1977).
168. H.B. 333 Daily Legislative Report (CCH) Rpt. No. 99.77 June 27, 1977. The bill was
subsequently vetoed by Illinois Governor James Thompson. However, the Illinois Senate
resoundingly overruled the veto.
169. A survey conducted by Planned Parenthood Federation of America disclosed that
since the Supreme Court's decisions in Beal and Maher, more than twenty states have
eliminated public funding of elective abortions for indigent women. These states will still pay
for abortions necessary to save the woman's life. The states that have taken this action
include: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas.
Utah, and Vermont. Missouri and Indiana did not pay for elective abortions even before the
Supreme Court decision. Kansas has not paid for abortions since May, 1977. Chicago Daily
Law Bulletin, Aug. 16, 1977, at 1., col. 3.
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example, an abortion could be medically necessary because of the
patient's emotional condition.
CONCLUSION

If the cancellation of state and federal funds for elective abortions
becomes widespread, there will be a far-reaching impact on American society. If a state elects to encourage its valid interest in childbirth and restricts Medicaid funding for elective abortions, more
indigent women may be forced either to seek "back alley" abortions,
or to carry their pregnancies to term. In 1974, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare estimated that if federal funds for
elective abortions were eliminated, an estimated 125 to 250 women
would die from self-induced abortions. 110
Additionally, self-induced
abortions could lead to serious medical complications in as many as
25,000 cases. 1 ' Moreover, for those women who are forced to bear
unwanted children, emotional and psychological effects upon the
mother and child are inevitable.
Adverse economic implications are also likely to result from a
state's decision not to fund elective abortions. As more indigent
women's pregnancies culminate in birth, expenses for the care of the
mother and child will lead to higher welfare budgets and larger
welfare rolls. "2 Furthermore, the taxpayer will be affected by restrictive abortion legislation through corresponding taxes to offset
increased welfare costs.
Thousands of indigent women will be affected by legislation that
prohibits the use of public funds for elective abortions. Minority
women, however, will be disproportionately affected by such legislation since "[bilacks and other non white groups are heavily overrepresented among both abortion patients and medicaid recipients."'' 3 It has been said that a society is judged by the way it treats
its minority members. American society will be subject to such
judgment in the near future, when, and if, restrictive abortion legislation is passed by Congress and the states.
ANGELA BENZO NORMAN
170. See generally Senate Debate on § 209 of Department of Labor, Health, Education
and Welfare Appropriations Act, 122 CONG. REc. 10794 (daily ed. June 28, 1977).
171. Id. at 10794-95.
172. Id. at 10794. According to an estimate compiled by the Department of HEW in 1974,
if federal funding of elective abortions were eliminated, the additional costs to the government in the form of expenses for medical care and public assistance for first year after birth
of the child would be between $450-565 million.
173. 97 S. Ct. at 2397 n.3, (Marshall, J., dissenting).

